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In this paper we argue there is a need for a formalised description of musical interaction,
which allows reasoning about the musical decisions of human and computational players.
To this end, we deﬁne a simple model of musical transmission which is amenable to
distribution among several musical agents. On top of this, we construct a model of musical
perception, based on analysis functions from the musical surface to values on lattices.
These values are then used to construct a musical context, allowing for a music-oriented
version of concepts such as common ground. This context allows for the interpretation
of individual musical output as a stream of discrete actions, with the possibility of
constructing sets of performative actions, analogous to those used in Speech Act Theory.
This allows musical agent systems to construct output in terms of a communicative
dialogue, and should enable more responsive, intelligent participation from these virtual
musicians. Finally, we discuss a prototype system which implements these concepts in
order to perform piano duets with human performers, and discuss how this theory can
be seen as a better deﬁned extension of previous theories.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Musical interaction deals with the various relations between agents who are producing music. Often, music is conceived
of as sequences of musical events (or notes) in time, and analysis focuses on the relations holding between parts of this
“musical surface”.1 At this level, there are the traditional musicological questions about features of the music, for example
deriving the key of a passage from the notes in it or extracting the underlying metrical structure from a series of note
onsets.
Another level of analysis considers the relation between agents and the notes they are producing or hearing. This in-
cludes traditionally includes psychomusical questions such as why certain sets of notes are pleasing, and music performance
questions such as what a particular rendering of a set of notes can tell us about the higher level structures a performer is
using, or whether we can relate performances to particular agents and identify a style.
The questions addressed by this work are about the way in which the playing of one musical agents is related to that of
another — to focus on the communicative aspects of the musical experience rather than those which can be directly derived
from the musical surface or understood by analysing the relationship between a deﬁned musical structure and a listener.
This is achieved by casting music in terms of intentional, communicative actions; ﬁrstly, we must deﬁne what is meant
by an action in the context of playing music, and secondly we must provide a manner to relate these actions together. When
a group of musicians play together, they will each output a stream of notes and silences. Some of this output is of particular
* Corresponding author.
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1 This is a term from Lerdahl and Jackendoff [1], and indicates the “lowest level of representation which has musical signiﬁcance” [2, p. 219], and is
used here in the sense of “the level of music representation of most use to the task at hand”.0004-3702/$ – see front matter © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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rhythmic and harmonic structures, marking structurally salient points in time and so on. This paper gives a model which
can serve as the basis for recognising these actions and understanding their interactive function.
1.1. Motivation
The notion of communicative actions can be traced back to Searle and Austin [3,4], and was originally used to describe
the manner in which words could be used to change the world. The use of communicative acts in multi-agent systems is
widespread — see for example [5] or [6] — since deﬁning formal semantics for communicative actions allows the modelling
of patterns of interaction as protocols based on the exchange of communicative actions, and allows agents to reason about
the beliefs and intentions of other agents (e.g. [7]). Here we take a top-down approach to exploring what an analogous
formulation for musical interactions could look like.
The issue which prompted the creation of Speech Act Theory — a reaction to the Positivist position that everything of
value in language could be represented as true or false logical statements, and hence the need to talk about communication
rather than truth — can be seen even more strongly when studying music, where there is no commonly accepted notion of
truth or semantic grounding.
The analogy between communicative actions and musical performance is suggested by the musical literature which
refers to musical improvisation and performance in terms of “conversation” or “discussion” between the musicians [8–10];
in particular Coventry and Blackwell [8] draw heavily on Grice [11] to characterise musical playing in pragmatic terms (as
opposed to syntactic or semantic).
Murray-Rust et al. [12–14] are previous attempts by the authors to formalise communicative musical acts in the context
of a multi-agent system.
Given the usefulness of Speech Act Theory and the notion of Communicative Actions to the AI and Multi-Agent Systems
communities, it is reasonable to suppose that applying these ideas to the study of computer music will yield interesting
results. However, despite the similarities between traditional Communicative Acts and musical communication, there are
some structural differences which indicate that a new model should be created.
Firstly there is the question of semantics in music — there is not the sense of “literal meaning” of musical playing that
might correspond to the literal meaning of a natural language statement, and many authors (e.g. Wiggins [15], Sloboda [16])
suggest that music is semiotic rather than semantic. It is possible in certain situations for the people playing music to have
quite different ideas about what is happening, but for the interaction to still be considered “successful”. Cross [17] discusses
this polysemic nature of music at length.
Secondly, there is the aspect of temporality; musicians typically play simultaneously with other musicians, rather than
alternating discrete actions — however, there is some support for the idea that even though the musicians are playing at
the same time, they may not all be communicating at the same time [10]. The time at which actions happen must be taken
into account, not simply the order in which they occur, and any system which designed to interact musically has to respect
realtime constraints, which has implications both for performance, and for the richness of its temporal representation.
It is generally necessary to model interaction between more than two agents, which is the case usually treated in
dialogue — with some exceptions, e.g. [18,19]. Although some existing agent protocols do this, musical work demands a
different kind of ﬂexibility and approach to collaboration.
There is also a range of levels of autonomy given to musicians while they play; for example, the strong constraints
of a string quartet, where the correct notes must be played in the correct order stands in contrast to a free jazz group,
where there is no such notion. This means that musical improvisation should be seen as a continuum, from the most rigidly
structured to the most “free”. Benson [20, pp. 26–30] gives a possible categorisation for these differences, e.g.
Improvisation1 “Filling-in” certain details that are not notated in the score, e.g. tempi, timbre, attack, dynamics.
Improvisation2 Addition of notes to the score that the performer is expected to perform, such as trills, and ﬁlling in ﬁgured
bass parts.2
Improvisation5 Addition or subtraction of complete measures, passages or scores.
Improvisation10 The composer uses a particular work as a template, to produce a more complex (or simply different) work.
There are two points to take from this:
• on a musical level, even in the most rigorously notated work, there is scope for individual interpretation, which will
occur with reference to the other members of the musical ensemble;
• in terms of building systems which communicate with humans, there is a continuum of situations to address, each
of which can have quite precise bounds put on the level of autonomy required or allowed — it is hence a very rich
problem set.
2 Improvisation1,2 are both common in Baroque scores, forming an expected part of Baroque musical practice.
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A large amount of work has been performed in the direction of identifying the structures behind music; possibly the best
known is the Generative Theory of Tonal Music (GTTM) [1], which provides a listening grammar for music. This comprises
a set of four hierarchical descriptors that give progressive reﬁnements of different aspects of the musical surface, which has
informed a range of computational systems (e.g. Smoliar [21]). The GTTM gives a very detailed analysis of music, but only
from the point of view of listening, and also from the position of having listened to an entire piece. Less well known, but
more appropriate to the current work is the model proposed by Pressing [22], which deals with the processes by which a
single improviser creates music. This works with music as it unfolds in time, and makes use of cognitive models to give an
account of human musical performance.
The analysis of the structural and intentional elements of music which form part of a communicative dialogue between
intelligent agents has not been addressed in a systematic manner. However, there are several computational systems which
deal with the notion of musical agents, with origins in Minsky [23,24]. Ueda and Kon [25] details a framework for “Mobile
Musical Agents”, but leaves open the question of how the agents structure their playing. The Continuator [26,27] is a system
which functions as a partner in musical improvisation, by completing sequences learnt from its human partners; Pachet’s
work on MusES is also relevant here [28,29], for developing the notion that some parts of musical output can be thought
of as actions. Two more recent systems are described in Fonseka [30], which plays certain contemporary music pieces, and
Wulfhorst et al. [31], which looks at beat and harmonic tracking for groups of agents.
1.3. Structure
The rest of this paper will develop the theory of Musical Acts, by:
• identifying the characteristics required of communicative acts in music;
• deﬁning a mechanism for agents to extract features from the music they hear;
• using this feature extraction to allow reasoning about the musical beliefs of other agents;
• constructing musical actions based on this form of analysis and reasoning;
• demonstrating that this model can be implemented in a real computational system;
• showing that this model captures both an intuitive notion of musical action, and can be used to construct and extend
similar previous formulations.
2. Musical acts
Given these differences and points of interest, we can start to frame what Musical Acts are, and what they are useful for.
The rationale for developing this theory is to create a narrative “plan-view” of a musical interaction, which sheds light on
the actions musicians take and the reasons for those actions.
Much like Communicative Actions, qualities which these acts must have are:
Embodiment through the production of music; much as speech acts are embodied through the production of utterances
within certain contexts, musical acts must have a manifestation in music.
Intention is what differentiates a musical act from general musical playing. A musical act should have perlocutionary force
— it should be an attempt to change the state of the world or the actions of others by its production, in a more
signiﬁcant sense than the mere fact that it has been produced.
Intelligibility is necessary for a successful act; if it is not understood, then it will fail to change the world, as other musicians
will fail to react to it. So, the act must be conceptualised within the context of a certain musical situation, with a
certain expectation of understanding from the other musicians.
So given these requirements, some questions are raised about the characteristics of Musical Acts, and how they may be
determined:
• What are the effects of Musical Acts?
• How can Musical Acts be detected?
• How is the intention behind an act determined?
• Can acts occur in the context of scored music, or are they only applicable to improvised music?
To address some of these, we will ﬁrst focus on the kinds of actions to be discussed. When human musicians play
together, there are many things which take place; glances are exchanged, feet are tapped, music is played, particular phrases
are played at particular times and so on. For the purposes of this analysis, we will ﬁrst decide to ignore extramusical actions
— those which occur outside of the musical surface; this includes nods, glances, the foot tapping and body movement used
for synchronisation, hand signals for jazz chords, the conductor’s baton and every other action which is not contained by
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impossible to analyse actions which are not contained within the surface.
Secondly, we make a distinction between conventionalised and free musical actions:
Conventionalised Musical Actions are uses of particular musical phrases with particular conventionalised meanings in certain
styles of music at certain points. For example, the “change rhythm” used in many African drumming traditions,
which signals that the next section of the piece should begin, and would be known and understood by all the
players.
Free Musical Actions are parts of the musical surface which can be seen as actions by their relation to the musical context
surrounding them. Their meaning or import can only be inferred as part of a complete musical interaction. For
instance, these are the moments when the drummer introduces a new rhythm, and the bassist starts ﬁlling in the
gaps; when a new melody gets passed around all the members of an improvising ensemble; when the backing
section adopt ideas from a soloist’s playing.
In some cases, the line between musical actions which are understood through convention and those which are under-
stood through some more general musical understanding may be poorly deﬁned. The desired distinction is that convention-
alised actions are deﬁned by particular conﬁgurations of notes — speciﬁc forms of playing which can, in general, be made
explicit. We ignore these, and instead concentrate on free musical actions are understood in the context of a particular
musical interaction, and deal with the relationships between the playing of the players rather than any speciﬁc phrases or
material.
2.1. Musical acts: an intuitive formalisation
When musicians play together, there is generally some set of musical structures which all of the musicians would agree
on. For example tempo, chord structure, song structure and so on. In different musical styles, this shared understanding
may take different forms: in an orchestra it could be a printed score along with a set of rehearsed directions about how to
play it, in a free jazz ensemble, it may be a diffuse, implicit knowledge of what is currently happening on several different
levels. This shared representation comes from two sources — pre-existing structures, such as scores or musical traditions,
and extemporaneously created material which arises as part of the interaction between the musicians.
During the course of the musical interaction, musical output can be roughly divided into two sorts: that which is ex-
pected according to the shared representation that the agents have, and that which is unexpected or novel. This distinction
needs more analysis, as it may be that only certain aspects of the music are predicted, while others are novel — for instance,
playing the expected melody with a different rhythm, or unexpected expressive character, playing the expected rhythm, but
accenting different notes. Certain features of the music played can be seen as novel, and hence can be seen as a vehicle for
musical change. This means that all of the repetitive and commonplace aspects of the music can be ignored — the drummer
keeping time, the fact that the string quartet are playing the right notes — in favour of analysing the novel occurrences,
such as the phrasing structure the drummer uses, and the way that the expressive aspects of the violin’s playing change in
response to the cello.
Playing something which differs from the shared representation is necessary in order for an action to be intentional, and
act as an attempt to alter the shared representation of music which the musicians have.
2.2. An example: Little Blue Frog
“Little Blue Frog” [32], is used as an example for what a Musical Act analysis of a piece of music looks like. The analysis
is carried out from a personal listening perspective — that is, without recourse to transcriptions or other theoretical expla-
nations, using only my individual musical competences, and to offer a view of what the ﬁrst author personally found to be
the most interesting parts of the interaction. This is fully in keeping with the philosophical thrust of Musical Act Theory
— that meanings are extracted and used by individuals, who have their own capabilities, idiosyncrasies and deﬁciencies,
and any model must take this into account. The full analysis, along with deﬁnitions of the performatives used is given in
Appendix B.
This is an intuitive overview of what musical acts should look like, and provides a motivation for the theoretical work
carried out in the next section. In Section 6.3 we will give more formal deﬁnitions in terms of the logic presented in the
rest of this paper.
3. Describing music
The ﬁrst part of this model is concerned with the ways in which higher level structures may be derived from the ﬂow
of music, as this is felt to be a prerequisite for understanding action and intention, in much the same way as concepts and
structure can be derived from natural language sentences.
For the purposes of this model we assume a musical surface which has been segmented into discrete events such as
notes, percussive strikes, glissandi, trills, etc. We are interested in building up a model for expressing higher level musical
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attached to it. Rectangular brackets denote the source of the descriptors where ap-
propriate.
Facet An aspect of music to be analysed. Examples: TimeSignature, Chord, Chord
Sequence, Melodic Contour
Value A value for a facet, e.g. for Time Signature 4/4,3/4,6/8 . . .
Descriptor A mapping from facet to value, i.e. (TimeSignature: 4/4)
Analyser A procedure for generating descriptors from the musical surface
Fig. 1. Facets, values, analysers and descriptors.
structures, which can serve as the building blocks for an understanding of the communicative processes occurring while
music is being made.
These constructs must allow for the following properties of musical descriptions:
• there will be several descriptions which could be applied to the same piece of music — for example a single note may
well have rhythmic, harmonic and melodic functions; this polysemic nature is one of the properties of music which
motivates the current work;
• the set of descriptions used will vary with the type of music and the skills and interests of the performer and listener,
so not only may different agents have different capabilities, the range of potential capabilities cannot be known ahead
of time.
It is also necessary to be able to calculate these descriptions and that they should be susceptible to automated reasoning
methods in order to construct appropriate output.
In order to capture the notion of multiple structures being attached to a piece of music, the notion of facets will be
introduced; these are descriptive classiﬁcations for certain aspects of the musical surface. Any particular piece of music can
be analysed simultaneously along many different facets, depending on the capabilities of the agent (or person) performing
the analysis, the style of the music and the results required.
An analysis procedure carries out the task of attaching a speciﬁc value to a facet; this mapping will be termed a descriptor,
and the process an analyser (see Fig. 1).
An informal notation will be used here to represent these descriptors as facet–value pairs; as an example, a very simple
descriptor would be (Time-Signature: 4/4), which delimits the set of possible musical excerpts where the signature is 4/4.
Before progressing further, it should be stated that:
• descriptors are essentially perceptual objects; a given set of descriptors only accounts for a possible analysis of the
music; they are subjective and not necessarily complete;
• in the coming examples, the descriptors used may not seem to capture the essence of musical knowledge about the
subject; this should be taken as a property of those particular descriptors, rather than an issue with the theory —
simplistic descriptions of music have been purposefully used to make the logical structure as clear as possible;
• facets will be considered independently, although in general there may be some relation between the values assigned
to certain facets.
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after the root note, a ﬁfth, and a seventh which may be major or dominant; major sevenths are notated with a ‘7’, while dominant sevenths are notated
‘7’.
3.1. Values and their relations
In order for this system of description to be of use, the form of values should be constrained by the minimum amount
necessary to allow the kinds of reasoning we are going to perform — there are many ways in which music is analysed, and
the easier it is to implement and use these analyses within the model, the more useful it will be.
A value for a facet should be thought of in set-theoretic terms; if we take the set of all possible pieces of music, a value
for a facet deﬁnes a certain subset of these possible pieces of music.
In order to allow for a rich range of reasoning about the relations between these values, we add the restriction that these
subsets are ordered, so that they form a lattice — a similar formulation to Concept Lattices (e.g., [33]). This is designed to
capture the notion that many descriptions of music have various levels of specialisation and interrelation — see for example
Fig. 2, which gives a sketch of how different musical ideas (the root of the chord, major/minor chords, “extensions”) can
be used simultaneously to deﬁne different chords. The ordering restriction means that for any two values, it is possible to
calculate their join — analogous to the union of the two subsets — and their meet — analogous to the intersection between
the two subsets.
These lattices can be represented as directed graphs, where each node is a particular value, with specialisation increasing
as one descends the graph. For instance, in Fig. 2, the second row contains concepts which specify a single part of the chord
(either the root node or the relation between the root and the third), the next row contains values which specify two parts
of the chord, etc. In this form, the join of two nodes is their ﬁrst common ancestor, and the meet is their ﬁrst common
descendant.
In addition to this, two special symbols are used:
 is the top element of the lattice, and is used to signify that no value is speciﬁed for that facet. This corresponds to the
set of all possible musical fragments;
 is the bottom of the lattice, and is encountered when values are combined such that no pieces of music can satisfy the
resulting condition — in the jazz chord example (Fig. 2, it is impossible to specify more than 4 parts of the chord, so
values in the “Fully Speciﬁed” row are connected downwards to .
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(c) Altered Concept Relation (a is shared ancestor) (d) Disjoint Concept Relation
Fig. 3. Illustration of different concept relations between two values o and n.
Using only the join relationship given by the lattice structure, it is possible to create a variety of relations which can be
extracted from any pair of values. These are designed to capture the important parts of the relations between these values,
without being speciﬁc about exactly what the values are.
In order to talk about what is happening musically, we would like to be able to take two values for a single facet and
compute a relation between them — for instance to compare the chords on agent is playing with those another is playing,
or to compare the rhythm an agent is playing with the one it was playing previously.
Looking at two values n and o, the relations we deﬁne between them are as follows (see Fig. 3):
Same n = o.
Subsumed indicates that n is a specialisation of o — that n is subsumed by o, or that n ⊂ o. On the graph n is a descendant
of o, and describes a smaller set of musical values; alternatively, the join of o and n is o. Looking at Fig. 2, we
could say that “A7 is subsumed by A”.
Subsumes indicates that n is less specialised than o, or that o ⊂ n. In graph terms, this means the new value is an ancestor
of the old; in lattice terms, the join of o and n is n. Referring again to Fig. 2, we could say that “Major chords
subsumes A major”.
Alter indicates that n is an alteration of o — they have some elements in common. In graph terms they share a common
ancestor a, or in lattice terms their join is non-empty, i.e. in Fig. 2 “A- is an alteration of A”.
Disjoint indicates there is no commonality between n and v . Their only common ancestor is  (which is an ancestor of
every node), or their join is an empty set. In Fig. 2, “A is disjoint from B”.
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Fig. 4. Two different lattices for analysing chords showing chords related to C minor, E major and G minor (see Fig. 2 for an explanation of notation).
Fig. 5. Example chords for analysis.
This set of relations will be labelled Rel:
Rel =
def
{SAME,SUBSUMED,SUBSUMES,ALTER,DISJOINT}
3.2. Analysis procedures
An analysis procedure A f for a particular facet f can be deﬁned as a function which produces descriptors — facet–value
tuples. That is, when given a fragment of music M as input, an analyser for facet f maps it into the lattice f (notated L f ):
A f : M → L f
It is generally assumed that an agent will have a set of analysers which it can apply to new music; the set of facets over
which these analysers act is notated F . As noted before, there is no universal set of analysers, and different agents may
have different analysers for the same facets. In order to make this clear, two chord analysers are detailed below. The lattices
used by these analysers are shown in Fig. 4.
The ﬁrst analyser — Anursery — is a “Nursery Rhyme” treatment of chords, where the lattice simply comprises a node for
each major and minor triad (Fig. 4(a)). Ajazz takes a richer, jazz oriented approach. Here again, we start with a node for
each triad, but this is now augmented with nodes for all the major and minor seventh variations of these chords, and extra
relations are created between the nodes (Fig. 4(b)).
Now consider the reaction of these two analysers to the piece of music shown in Fig. 5, which contains two chords: C,
E, G, B followed by E, G, B, D. The analysers are asked to calculate the values for each of the chords, and the relation
between them.
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two possibilities — Cm or E — and would need some way to determine which of these was more appropriate. There is a
third possibility, which is that it would refuse to classify the chord, but it will be assumed that it attempts to locate every
input somewhere on its lattice, even if the ﬁt is not exact. It is possible that a well designed analyser would choose Cm in
this case. The following chord is analysed in a similar manner as E. When computing the relation between them, it can
simply note that they are different nodes, and say that they are disjoint.
On the other hand, Ajazz can classify both of these chords exactly on its lattice, as C-7 and E7 respectively. Furthermore,
when computing a relation between them, it can determine that E is a parent to both chords — since adding a C to an E
chord gives C-7 and adding a D to an E chord gives E7 — and hence that moving from C-7 to E7 is an alteration.
It is open to debate whether this ability to capture extra relationships between values and give richer descriptions of
music makes Ajazz a better analyser, and the response is that it is up to a particular agent to decide which analysers are
most useful for the style of music which it is playing — whether C-7 is seen as an alteration of E7 is dependent on the
theory within which one is working, and different approaches will be appropriate for different musics. This is important to
the generality of this model, as it means that any musical theory can be used so long as it can be represented as a lattice
of values and an analysis function from the musical surface to these values.
4. Playing with other musicians
This section expands the model to take into account the different agents involved in an interaction, and what they can
deduce about each other’s musical beliefs.
We develop two concepts related to this: the musical context and musical common ground.
4.1. Listening to others
As previously mentioned, agents are likely to have a range of analysers to apply to any music which they hear — each
analyser will produce its own descriptor, e.g. (Tonality: C minor), (TimeSignature: 4/4), etc. The symbol ⇒A is used to mean
“A can extract values for the facets. . . ”, so if A has an analysis procedure for facets F = { f1, . . . , fn}:
m ⇒A
{
( f0, v0m), . . . , ( fn, vnm)
}
In other words, for each facet f i ∈ F , A can extract a value vim .
The formulation is that when agent B hears agent A play music, B believes that A has expressed3 all the properties that
B can derive from the music4:
HeardB
(
PlayedA(m)
)∧ (m ⇒B D) → BelB
(
ExpressedA(D)
)
where D = {( f0, v0m), . . . , ( fn, vnm)} for the set of descriptors which B can extract from m. It should be noted that this set
of descriptions may be entirely different from whatever representation (or process) A used to create the music, and that A
and B might have entirely different sets of analysers.
4.2. Current values and musical context
The concept of musical context, or the “musical now”, is intended to capture the idea of “what all the musicians are
doing at the moment”. The extraction of values discussed above is outside of any temporal framework; it is simply the
method of determining what features are embodied in a fragment of music. Since music happens within its particular
temporality, this extraction process must similarly be embedded in a temporal structure.
In order to hide some of the temporal complexity from our analysis, a state based description of the musical interaction
is introduced. We continue the assumption that everything of interest in the interaction is captured in the output of the
agent’s analysers (this is discussed more fully in Section 5). We can then talk about the interaction as a series of states, so
that any change of a value leads to a change of state.
Each value for each facet in the current state is labelled the current value, so CVa( f , v f ) states that the current value of
a’s playing when analysed on facet f is v f .
More formally, for an agent x in a group of agents A, with a set F of facets it can analyse, the context is deﬁned as the
conjunction of all relevant facet–value statements:
Contextx =
∧
a∈A
∧
f ∈F
CVa( f , v f )
3 Expressed is used in a weak sense here, to mean that those properties could be perceived in the music — it does not necessarily mean that they were
intended.
4 HeardB (PlayedA(m)) is used to indicate that B has heard A play the musical excerpt m, and BelB (φ) is used to indicate that B believes the proposition φ.
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These formulations work for a single agent analysing the output of its peers; in order to reason about actions to take,
it is necessary to discuss the beliefs which the agent can reasonably hold about what the other agents are doing. Here we
draw on the notions of common knowledge and common ground. For common knowledge, notated CK(φ):
for a proposition φ, it is common knowledge that φ among a group of agents iff all know that φ, all know that all know
that φ, all know that all know that all know that φ, etc.
This is a property of the system as a whole, which can prove problematic; hence the use of “common ground” — the
more pragmatic notion of that which a speaker presupposes to be common knowledge [34], which is then a property of an
individual.
In terms of the musical agent system, using the assumption that every agent can hear the output of every other, and
that this fact is common knowledge, it is clear that the playing of any agent is common knowledge:
PlayedA(m) → CK
(
PlayedA(m)
)
as is the fact that this has been heard by every other agent (for all B 
= A):
Played(A,m) → CK(HeardB
(
PlayedA(m)
))
It is possible to imagine situations in which it is not the case that all of the musicians hear each other, but this covers a
wide range of “normal” musical situations, and is in most cases a state which is desirable even if not attained.
If an agent believes that another agent can analyse a certain facet of music, and will produce the same values for that
facet, it will believe that this agent will derive the same values from the music it hears:
BelA
(
CanAnalyseB( f )
)
∧HeardA
(
PlayedC (m)
)
∧BelA
(
CVC ( f , v f )
)
→ BelA
(
BelB
(
CVC ( f , v f )
))
Hence, given a set Fs of facets which A believes B will analyse in the same way:
BelA
(
CVc( f , v f )
)→ BelA
(
BelB
(
CVc( f , v f )
))
(for f ∈ Fs)
Now, suppose that A believes there is a set Fc of facets which every agent can analyse, that all agents will arrive at the
same values for these facets, and also that these facts are common knowledge. It follows then that A believes the values
which can be deduced for these facets are common knowledge:
BelA
(
CVx( f , v f )
)→ CGA
(
CVx( f , v f )
)
(for f ∈ Fs, x ∈ Agents)
We deﬁne this as musical common ground — the set of values which an agent reasonably believes to have been extracted
by every other agent, and hence to be common knowledge.
This expectation of understanding is supported by the fact that much of music education, particularly music theory, is
concerned with creating a common vocabulary for musical occurrences; in general, within any particular style, there are
aspects of music which it would be taken as read that any skilled practitioner would understand. For example, it would be
assumed when playing jazz that people will agree on the time signature a piece is in, or what the chord structure is.
There are many situations where these assumptions turn out to be false: people may disagree about what chords are
being used, about whether a piece is in 6/8 or 3/4 time, etc., but they are reasonable assumptions to make within a
given cultural context. Similarly, when musicians with different backgrounds get together, the shared set of features may be
smaller; for these reasons, the set of features which any agent shares with another may dynamically change, both within
a single interaction and over the course of many interactions as expectations are adjusted, new capabilities are discovered
and deﬁciencies are exposed.
It is also sometimes useful to think of common ground among a subset of the players: the beginning bassist may be
happy to know the root of each chord being played, while the pianist and guitarist share an understanding of the extensions
and passing notes they are using, and the drummer might have little knowledge of the actual chords used — see Appendix C
for a worked example of this.
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The focus of this work is to develop a framework within which to analyse musical action; up to this point, we have
developed a model of musical description and belief structures which allows the discussion of what is happening at any
given time, and what the agents involved can deduce from this. The transition to looking at actions is made by casting the
musical interaction as a series of states (deﬁned by their musical descriptors), and analysing the transitions between the
states. In order to do this, an assumption is made:
Acontext: everything which is of interest to an agent about the musical interaction is contained in the context which it
maintains.
In other words, the agent is only interested in those aspects of music for which it has analysers which can produce
descriptors — everything else is assumed to be unintelligible. This relates to the requirements in Section 2, that actions
must be intelligible (and also embodied in the input to the agent).
Given this, in order for anything to constitute a free musical action from the point of view of an agent hearing it, it must
involve a change to that agent’s context, and hence must involve a new state in the state description:
Aaction: all free musical actions consist of a change of state.
Turning this around, the converse assumption is that:
Astate: every change of state constitutes a musical action on the part of the agent whose value changed the state.
Both of these assumptions are discussed further in Section 5.4, but accepting them leads to the conclusion that analysing
the transitions between states gives a picture of the intentional actions present in the interaction. Since we deﬁne the
states in terms of values for which certain relationships (from Rel) may be calculated, we can start to use these relations to
characterise the changes.
5.1. Actions and relations
In order to extract actions from the musical surface, new playing is related to the context in which it occurred — in
other words, it is compared to the current values of the whole group at the time the action happens. Every time a new
value is expressed by an agent, a new state is created. The action is then a combination of:
• the musical surface so far, including the part which constitutes the action;
• the state description of the musical interaction;
• previous actions;
• the agents involved in the interaction;
• the new value which has just been played.
This refers to a speciﬁc action, by a speciﬁc agent at a certain point in time in a speciﬁc interaction. Since this is such
a speciﬁc event, it is not easily generalisable to other situations. Instead, a musical action signature is constructed, which
consists of:
• the relations between the new value being played and the current musical context;
• relevant relations between values in the current musical context.
5.2. Action signatures for two agents
In order to simplify this, consider the case of two agents playing together; agent A has introduced a new value for a
particular facet, so the values which are available to characterise the act are:
• A’s new value (anew),
• A’s old value (aold),
• B ’s old value (bold).
Since relationships are directional, there are six possible relationships to consider. However, since special signiﬁcance is
given to the new value played by agent a, relations are considered between (see Fig. 6 for details):
• anew and aold ,
• anew and b,
• aold and b.
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and new playing, Rother is the relation between a’s new playing and b’s previous playing, and Rprev is the relation which used to hold between a and b’s
playing.
Put together, this means an action signature is deﬁned as a triplet of relations — from Rel — for values of a certain facet.
ActionSignature =
def
(Rself , Rother, Rprev) where Rself , Rother, Rprev ∈ Rel.
In the rest of the text, it will often be important to know which agent produced an action signature. In this case, it will
be written AgentName: (Rself , Rother, Rprev), e.g. A: (SAME,ALTER,DISJOINT).
This does not entirely deﬁne the action — it characterises the relational aspects of it independent of the context it
occurred in. It does not include the musical surface, or even the part of it deemed to constitute the action, but is designed as
a compact, transferable representation of the components of the action which are useful from the point of view of analysing
interactions. The interaction can now be described using a series of these action signatures, as will be demonstrated in the
following paragraphs. Finally, due to structural constraints, not all combinations of relations are possible — see Appendix A
for a discussion of this.
5.3. A worked example
At this point a worked example is useful, to demonstrate these concepts in action. This involves two agents, A and B ,
who are both jazz musicians, and looks at a chordal analysis of their output. The analysis is going to be conducted from
the point of view of A, who is using the simple jazz chord analyser (Ajazz) from Section 3.2 to extract chords and their
relationships.
At the start of the example, A is playing a C chord (i.e. the notes C, E, G), while B is playing C7 (C, E, G, B), so A’s
value SUBSUMES B ’s. At some point, B decides to start playing C7 instead (C, E, G, B). This allows the calculation of three
relations:
Rself is the relation between B ’s new and old values. Even though A is conducting the analysis, when analysing the
actions of others, Rself describes the relations between the other’s values. The relation is from C7 to C7, and is
hence ALTER — they have a common ancestor in C .
Rother is the relation between B ’s new playing and A’s current playing, so between C7 and C, and is hence SUBSUMED.
Rprev is the relation which held between B ’s old value and A’s current value, i.e. between C7 and C, and is again
SUBSUMED.
This means that from A’s point of view, B has executed a musical action with the signature B: (ALTER,SUBSUMED,
SUBSUMED). It should be noted that B might have been using an entirely different method of analysis and generation —
this analysis depends on A’s perceptions and capabilities, which may be entirely different to B ’s. The exchange can be seen
in the ﬁrst two states of Fig. 7 while Table 1 represents a larger excerpt of this interaction in tabular form.
5.4. Reasonableness of Acontext and Astate
There are three assumptions (from Section 5) which are central to this form of analysis, which must be discussed. To
recap, they are:
Acontext: everything which is of interest to an agent about the musical interaction is contained in the context which it
maintains.
Aaction: all free musical actions consist of a change of state.
Astate: every change of state constitutes a musical action on the part of the agent whose value changed the state.
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Table 1
Example of representing a musical interaction as a series of actions.
State A B Action signature
s0 C  A: (SUBSUMED,SUBSUMED,SAME)
s1 C C7 B: (SUBSUMED,SUBSUMED,SUBSUMES)
s2 C C7 B: (ALTER,SUBSUMED,SUBSUMED)
s3 D C7 A: (DISJOINT,DISJOINT,SUBSUMES)
s4 D D B: (DISJOINT,SAME,DISJOINT)
There is a question as to how reasonable these assumptions are, and whether they hold for all musical situations. Firstly,
Acontext; within the bounds of this model, this is a safe assumption — agents are modelled with a set of analysis routines for
all of the features that they understand. Given this, it is fair to say that everything the agent is capable of understanding is
in the context. In a more general situation, it becomes somewhat tautological: the context is everything which the agent is
interested in. Carrying on from this, Aaction seems reasonable, as if the context represents everything an agent knows about
the interaction, then anything which does not alter the context is invisible to the agent.
Astate needs more defence, however, on several counts:
• an agent may alter its values unintentionally — for instance, it may be attempting to play a constant rhythm, but be
unable to keep a steady pulse, or it may play the wrong note in a chord;
• values may change in response to other processes. The major example of this would be if the agents are playing with
some form of score, which dictates certain aspects of the musical surface. In this case, the agents would need a way to
differentiate between intentional actions, and those which come about from following the referent, which are effectively
conventionalised actions, as they are pre-arranged between the group;
• lastly, not all actions are likely to be of equal signiﬁcance — for instance changing one note in the drum rhythm is likely
to be less important that an entirely new harmonic pattern. However, in certain styles of music, the single note change
could have a profound effect.
Given these concerns, it appears that some measure of the importance or interest of an action would be useful, so that
expected or trivial actions are noted as such, leaving more room to react to the truly novel and unexpected.
6. Extending actions
We have laid out a simple formulation of for Musical Actions, which by design has ignored many aspects of the theory.
In this section we discuss:
• how Musical Actions may be used to inform playing;
• how to deal with multiple musicians simultaneously;
• how these Musical Actions relate to the intuitive formulation of Musical Acts given in Section 2.1.
6.1. Choices
This theory of musical actions has a dual purpose: to describe the music played by agents in terms of high level actions,
and to give agents a framework for making decisions about what to play.
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Assuming that A is using musical actions as a basis for playing music, there are two high level components to this decision:
• what musical action signature to use;
• what high level feature to use to embody it.
Firstly, A must decide on an action signature to produce. This can be seen as choosing values for Rself , Rother , Rprev , or
action signatures can be seen as discrete entities with some kind of performative meaning as discussed later in this paper.
The only constraint on this choice is that Rprev is already determined — it is the value between A’s current playing and B ’s
new playing, in this case SUBSUMES.5
Suppose now that A decides to do something radical, and play some music which does not match what is currently
happening — that is to say, a new value which is DISJOINT from both A and B ’s current playing. A would then decide to
use an action signature of A: (DISJOINT,DISJOINT,SUBSUMES) for the next piece of output.
Once A has chosen this action signature, it is necessary to ﬁnd some musical values which embody it. The choice now
is out of all the values which satisfy the Rself and Rother relationships — in this case, a value must be found which is
DISJOINT both from C and C7. If A were to choose to play a D chord, the interaction would be as shown in Fig. 7.
6.2. Extension to multiple agents
The simple formulation of Musical Actions used a pair of agents playing together. In a more general case, it is necessary
to look at the actions which occur between several musicians at once. An easy solution for this would be to suggest that the
interactions between each pair of agents be analysed separately. This has the beneﬁt of not introducing any more theoretical
complexity, but does not capture the fact that in most musical situations, the group will be in agreement on the majority
of features.
To rectify this, the notion of common acceptance is introduced, based on the musical common ground which was introduced
earlier. This is designed to capture the set of musical values which the group agrees on through their playing.
Recall that there is a common ground of values which is the set of all values for each facet that an agent reasonably
expects the others to understand. Looking at a single facet from this common ground gives the set of values which the
agents are producing. Taking the join of this set of values gives the most speciﬁc value for that particular facet which
contains the playing of every agent — this is the commonly accepted value for that facet.
This formulation allows for an individual agent to construct groups of agents whose playing is in some way similar, and
construct responses to the group, rather than each agent individually. Appendix C gives an example of this.
6.3. Relations between Musical Acts and musical action signatures
Section 2.1 gave a textual, top-down description of a method for interpreting musical interactions in terms of intentional
actions, which provided the impetus for creating this model of musical interaction. One of the prerequisites for using Musical
Acts computationally is a semantics for the conditions of expressing a musical act, and constraints on the form in which it
is expressed. In order to do this, we now revisit the performatives given in Appendix B, and attempt to formulate them in
terms of musical action signatures. The situation is taken to be: A is performing an action on facet f by emitting vnew after
previously emitting vprev; vold is used to indicate the value played by the other agents — if differentiation is needed, then
vall refers to the set of individual values, and vcommon refers to their common musical ground.6 The seven performatives can
then be formalised as follows:
Propose requires that there was previously no accepted value for a particular facet, i.e. that vold = ; hence, Rself , Rother
must be SUBSUMED (since  subsumes everything). Different formulations could be created around whether
vold =  uses vall and hence means that none of the agents have a value for f (Propose-New), or that vcommon is
used, so there is no common value for f (Propose-Discussion).
Conﬁrm conveys an acceptance of an idea proposed by another; so, Rother should be SAME (although SUBSUMED
might be allowed). It also requires that the new value was not previously contained in vprev , so Rprev ∈
{SUBSUMES,ALTER,DISJOINT}. Additionally, since Rother = SAME, Rself must be the inverse of Rprev .
Reject indicates that the new playing is not accepted, so it must be different from it; hence Rother ∈ {DISJOINT,ALTER}.
It could also be argued that there should be no commonly accepted value for this facet, i.e. vcommon = .
Extend is the extension of currently accepted material, so Rother must be SUBSUMED. Since it is an extension, Rself cannot
be SUBSUMES, as that would indicate a withdrawing from the current position.
Alter involves altering a value which is already being used; so Rother must be ALTER.
5 To be clear, Rprev for this signature is between the same two values as Rother from the previous signature, but the direction of the relationship is
opposite, since A is now the one carrying out an action.
6 See Table 3 for a reminder of the symbol meanings; in particular , which means no value has yet been set for that facet.
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Formulation of example set of performatives using action signatures.
Performative Rself Rother Rprev Additional
Propose SUBSUMED SUBSUMED any vold = 
Conﬁrm R−1prev SAME SUBSUMES
ALTER
DISJOINT
Reject DISJOINT
ALTER
Extend ¬SUBSUMES SUBSUMED
Alter ALTER
Argue was an example of a composite act, where several people play without accepting each other’s values; this could
be modelled as a stream of acts where Rother was continually either ALTER or DISJOINT.
Request is a conventionalised action, and so it cannot be modelled with action signatures — it is an expected response to
a certain pattern of playing.
It can be seen that a particular musical action could be used in several different performatives; for example,
(SUBSUMED,SUBSUMED,SAME) could be either Propose or Alter, depending on the musical context and the interpreta-
tion of any particular agent, which is as desired — attribution of intention should not be a formally derived process at this
level. However, in the context of building a musical agent system, the question arises of the computability of these Musical
Acts. In several agent communication languages (for example [35,36]), performative intentions are explicitly represented.
This is an approach which could be used within a multi-agent system — each agent could label parts of the musical sur-
face with performatives to indicate intentions. However, this would not then extend to an understanding of human music
playing. It would hence be necessary to build a model of intentional musical behaviour, which could be trained on a large
corpus of human data, that was combined with the semantics for Musical Acts to give a possible interpretation of musical
interactions.
7. Case study
To test the workability of this theory in practice, MAMA was constructed — a prototype multi-agent musical system built
on the principles of Musical Acts. The system provides for the agents to have individual sets of analysis procedures, with
which they analyse the playing of others to produce a stream of Musical Action Signatures. These Musical Action Signatures
are then fed into a decision making module, which has been trained on a corpus of human playing to have a notion of how
human players respond in an improvisatory situation.
Appendix D details the functioning of this system, and a pilot experiment carried out using it. A more comprehensive
overview of the experiment and other case studies using the system can be found in Murray-Rust [14, Sections 10.2, 11].
The experiment was designed to measure the perceived performance of the system by comparing the subjects’ evalu-
ation of different musical partners — live and recorded humans, and the system in different conﬁgurations. By comparing
the rating of the humans for the different conﬁgurations, it was hoped to be able to determine whether the addition of
components based on Musical Acts improves the performance of the system.
“Canto Ostinato” (Simeon ten Holt) was chosen as the target piece for a variety of reasons, but the most important one
was that it illustrates a form of music where the notes are ﬁxed, but the players have a large amount of freedom to choose
the way the piece sounds. Within the given notes, the manner in which the notes are played — in particular which notes are
stressed — allows the player to choose certain melodies implicit in the sets of notes to pick out as interesting. This makes
it a useful testbed for interaction as it is constrained enough to allow for comparisons, but also open enough to allow the
players a large degree of musical freedom.
The system used a set of analyses which examined levels, slopes and patterns for note timing, length and loudness,
which were selected as appropriate for the piece at hand. An underlying assumption of this assumption is that an intelligent
musical agent would have a range of conﬁgurable analysis routines which could be brought to bear on the musical material,
and appropriate ones would be chosen, although this is beyond the current scope of the system.
The experimental results were unfortunately not signiﬁcant, although this is at least partially due to the small sample
size. However, it demonstrated the implementability of the theory.7
8. Discussion
From a theoretical perspective, the examples given in Section 5.3 show how this technique can be applied to aspects of
musical analysis, and produce a compact description of the communicative actions undertaken. Similarly, the discussion in
7 Selected audio and MIDI recordings from the experiment can be found at http://www.mo-seph.com/MusicalActExperiment.
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examined the question of whether or not the theory improves the performance of musical agents in their interactions with
humans. Next, we discuss in more depth the questions of whether the model is implementable, how it relates to previous
work and what improvements could be made in the future.
8.1. Implementation
Section 7 (and Appendix D) detailed a proof of concept system which embodies the basic mechanisms of Musical Act
Theory. The components of the theory which were implemented were:
• A collection of basic analysis and generation routines, which could derive values for facets from an incoming audio
stream, and calculate the requisite relations between them.
• A simple mechanism which could generate new Musical Action Signatures based on a combination of the values found
in playing and a database extracted from previous analysis of human playing.
• A routine for generating new facet values from the given MASs, which could then be used by the generation routines
to create real time output.
All of these operations could be carried out on a standard laptop (Pentium 1.3 GHz, 2 GB RAM, without problems. This
shows that at a basic level, all of the components of the framework can be implemented — analysing music to extract
values, extracting MASs, deciding on MASs and then ﬁnding based on these to use when generating output. In the future,
we envisage fuller implementations, allowing more musical versions of each of these components: more advanced analysis
and generation routines, a more musically advanced method for generating MASs and potentially higher level mechanisms
for managing the operation of all these components in the context of more general improvisational situations.
8.2. Relation to previous work
The most similar formulation of actions taken in a musical context is given in Pelz-Sherman [10]. Musicians are treated
as intelligent agents, who are capable of producing and interpreting musical signals, and using intelligence to generate new
plans and alter behaviour to optimise the performance of the group. The interaction between these agents is modelled in
communication theory terms: each agent may be either sending or receiving musical information, termed i-events. Agents
are sending when they play music which has a high rate of change, or a lot of “musical information”.8 Several types of
i-events are discussed, relating to different circumstances in which musical information is exchanged between two partic-
ipants. It would be useful to deﬁne these in terms of musical act signatures, as they would then provide a computational
implementation of an already existing theory about the nature of musical interaction.
The following list details all of the possible i-events from the formulation, and means for them to be translated into
musical action signatures:
Imitation is where one feature from an agent’s playing is adopted by another. In terms of musical actions, the important
fact is that Rother is SAME. However, it is also important that the previous playing did not contain this feature, so
Rself and Rprev must be ALTER or DISJOINT.9
Question and Answer events consist of some form of response to a cue, but the response need not use any features of the
cue. Some of these are stylised, and hence not detailed here, but the general deﬁnition would be that Rother is
either ALTER or DISJOINT. At this point, it might be useful to look at formulations across multiple values, such
that some of the Rothers are the same, while some are DISJOINT.
Completion/Punctuation occurs when one agent initiates a “directed movement”, which can be predicted to complete at a
certain time, and another agent completes this gesture. This can be modelled with Rother becoming SAME, on a
facet which looks at these kinds of directed gestures.
Interruption involves one agent playing in an undirected manner, which is decisively responded to by another. This could be
modelled as a speciﬁc case of Rother being ALTER or DISJOINT on a feature which tracks some sense of musical
direction.
So, musical action signatures can be used to provide a computational formulation for all of these i-events, conditional
on there being the necessary analysers to produce “musical direction” values. This is a fairly reasonable constraint, as to be
a high quality musical performer, an agent would need to have some ideas about the directions that individual agents and
the performance as a whole are taking.
Also, Pelz-Sherman [10, p. 130] mentions the idea of agent systems — subgroups of musicians whose playing is very
closely aligned. The notion presented here of overlapping regions of common ground within a group of agents gives a way
to analyse this computationally, and allow software agents to join these human agent systems.
8 The exact nature of musical information is not deﬁned by Pelz–Sherman, but the intent should be clear.
9 It should be noted that Rself must have the same value as Rprev if Rother is SAME.
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prearranged schema, and must occur in the moment, just as musical actions.
Another theory of musical improvisation is that provided by Pressing [37]. This work is very cognitively oriented, and
seeks to claim cognitive validity for all of the process it describes. The process of improvisation is modelled as:
({E},C, R,G,M)ik → Eik+1, k = 1 . . . K
where {E} is the previous playing of the improviser, C is the cognitive representation the improviser holds of the playing
of other members of the group, R is a referent or “score”, G is the improviser’s goals and M is the improviser’s long term
memory. The musical events have three components: objects are the lowest level representation of music dealt with, i.e. the
musical surface, features are properties of those objects, and processes are the parameters and processes which give rise to
those objects and their features. The improviser has three potential routes for generating new material:
Similar associative generation involves creating new events based on the current processes and parameters with minimal
changes;
Contrastive associative generation involves changing some but not all of the major parameters used;
Interrupt generation sets all of the processes and their parameters to new values.
The improvisation is seen as a series of groups of event clusters, with the ﬁrst cluster in each group being produced by
interrupt generation, and subsequent clusters by associative generation.
This can translated into relationships from Rel: interrupt generation is DISJOINT with previous playing, while asso-
ciative generation is one of the others. Since no formal distinction is made between similar and contrastive association,
it might be reasonable to suggest that contrastive association is typiﬁed by ALTER and similar by SAME,SUBSUMES,
SUBSUMED.
Once this is done, the contrast between Pressing’s work and Musical Acts is clearer: Pressing deals in detail with the
relations between a musician’s playing and what has gone before (and the processes underlying the playing), but only cur-
sorily with the relations between a musician’s playing and that of the other members of the group. Also, Musical Acts gives
a way to distinguish between the different possible relationships which does not rely on knowledge of internal cognitive
states. Apart from this, the two theories can be seen as broadly compatible, although Musical Acts makes no demands about
the processes which give rise to the musical output.
It is argued that both Pelz-Sherman’s and Pressing’s work can be at least partially represented within the theory of
Musical Acts, and certainly are not contradictory in any major dimension. Musical Acts is a computationally implementable
system, which goes beyond existing work in specifying relations between the playing of different musicians, and hence
represents an advance on previous theories.
8.3. Further work
There are some areas which have been noted as needing more theoretical development, particularly around coherence
of analysis, importance of actions, the use of repetition and the roles agents take within an improvisation. Firstly, all the
different facets of analysis are currently treated separately. Real values in musical playing are unlikely to be entirely separate,
so it is necessary to develop some notion of an action which affected several values at once, especially since a single piece
of playing may do this. A composite musical action could then involve the attachment of a set of musical action signatures
to a certain part of the musical surface.
Secondly, there is no built in mechanism for assigning different levels of importance to the different changes. This could,
however, be supported both at the level of comparing changes within a facet (i.e. is this volume change more important
than that one), and across facets. This could also link in with the notion of compound actions relating changes in several
values, and would for a key input for systems when they decide what actions to respond to.
Next, the idea of repetition is not fully handled at the moment; in general terms, playing the same phrase repeatedly
would generate actions on the ﬁrst repetition, but then no new information would be added. However, this is not entirely
in keeping with accounts of listening to music, especially where minimalist (and other repetition inﬂuenced) traditions are
considered. This could potentially be handled with Analysers which look at repetition, or it could be addressed with a more
fundamental extension to the theory.
Finally, nothing is said about the roles which agents take in interactions — soloist/backing, teacher/student, etc. This is
intentional — it is a layer to be built on top of these structures. From the study of human interaction, e.g. Pelz-Sherman
[10], there is a potential for roles to be abstracted and deﬁned in terms of the type of musical action signature which that
role is likely to produce. On a related note, the role of the listener has not been addressed in depth; it is assumed that a
listener can use the same techniques as a performer, simply without the ability to join in.
One underlying assumption which needs more exploration is the idea that every interesting musical property can be
represented sensibly using concept lattices. In response to this, it should be noted that the use of these structures was
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duction depend on any given set of pitch events being seen as an elaboration of a simpler structure — this is fully in
keeping with the idea of subsumption used in the lattice structures here. Although there are deﬁned limits to the appli-
cations of this technique, it at least provides an example of representing complicated musical structure using lattice-like
concepts.
Since the model is designed to be used in the context of an intelligent system, there are many possible avenues for
further work, but two of the most pressing are learning, and the assignment of intentional performatives to musical action
signatures.
Firstly, it is clear that musicians learn over time, both between performances and within the scope of a single interaction.
In the context of the MAMA system, a simple form of learning was used to help the system understand common patterns
in human interaction; this initial experiment could be widened and made more robust in a variety of ways. However
the more interesting aspects of learning could be applied to the parts of the system which had to be speciﬁed for the
particular piece being played — in particular, the use of certain analysis routines could be a more dynamic choice, as the
system experimented with analysing incoming music in different ways, it until if found analysers (and their related output
routines) which could both provoke and perceive change in the output of the other musicians.
Secondly, the formalisation of performative actions opens up the possibilities for virtual musicians to respond to the
intentional aspects of human playing; with a given set of performatives, there is a limited set of labels which can be applied
to a musical action, and some process could then be used to allow an agent its own strategy for choosing one of these labels
— for example by modelling the other musicians, or referring to a database of past interactions. The formalisation also
allows and encourages different sets of performatives to be experimented with, to ﬁnd whatever set is most appropriate
for a given circumstance. Desirable qualities of performative sets might be formal completeness — any action can only
have one performative label, or all possible actions have some performative label — or resonance with natural language
usage.
9. Conclusions
In this paper, we have developed a computational model of musical communication, using concept lattices. It allows
for a dense, style-independent description of the communicative actions which occur when agents play music together,
and provides the agents with a framework which can be used to create notions of musical common ground and to reason
about the actions and beliefs of other agents. Furthermore, this model has been implemented in a real-time system, to
play duets with human pianists. Finally, it was shown this model can be used to describe previous formulations of musical
communication, but allows for richer analysis as well as computational implementation.
We believe that this model can be the starting point for a rich variety of systems which interact musically with humans.
We hope to inspire the creation of musical systems which use Musical Acts as a framework for interaction, aided by the fact
that the current formulation is computationally implemented and so can be added to existing systems where appropriate.
Finally, understanding the relations between this formal system and human music making will drive the next level of
richness and complexity in Musical Act Theory.
Appendix A. The universe of action signatures
An action signature consists of a triple of relations, where each relation can take one of ﬁve values in
Rel =
def
{SAME,SUBSUMES,SUBSUMED,ALTER,DISJOINT}
At ﬁrst glance, this would appear to give 125 possible values for an action signature. On further inspection, however, this
is an overestimate; for example, it is not possible to have an action where Rself is SAME — there would be no grounds for
calling it an action. There are other constraints on which relations can hold between three values, and this is the subject of
an investigation in [14, Appendix B].
Rself Allowed values for Rother
Rprev = SAME
SUBSUMED SUBSUMED
SUBSUMES SUBSUMES
ALTER ALTER
DISJOINT DISJOINT
Rprev = SUBSUMED
SUBSUMED SUBSUMED
SUBSUMES SAME, SUBSUMED, SUBSUMES, ALTER, DISJOINT
ALTER SUBSUMED, ALTER, DISJOINT
DISJOINT DISJOINT
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Rprev = SUBSUMES
SUBSUMED SAME, SUBSUMED, SUBSUMES, ALTER
SUBSUMES SUBSUMES
ALTER SUBSUMES, ALTER
DISJOINT SUBSUMES, ALTER, DISJOINT
Rprev = ALTER
SUBSUMED SUBSUMED, ALTER
SUBSUMES SUBSUMES, ALTER, DISJOINT
ALTER SAME, SUBSUMED, SUBSUMES, ALTER, DISJOINT
DISJOINT SUBSUMES, ALTER, DISJOINT
Rprev = DISJOINT
SUBSUMED SUBSUMED, ALTER, DISJOINT
SUBSUMES DISJOINT
ALTER SUBSUMED, ALTER, DISJOINT
DISJOINT SAME, SUBSUMED, SUBSUMES, ALTER, DISJOINT
Appendix B. Little Blue Frog analysis
“Little Blue Frog” [32], on the Columbia/Legacy reissue of “Big Fun” is used as an example for what a Musical Act analysis
of a piece of music looks like. Annotated audio for this can be found at http://www.mo-seph.com/academic/littlebluefrog.
See also Table 3.
The analysis is carried out from a personal listening perspective — that is, without recourse to transcriptions or other
theoretical explanations, using only the ﬁrst author’s individual musical competences, and to offer a view of what was
personally found to be the most interesting parts of the interaction. For example, in the analysis, “scale” has been used to
refer to a collection of pitch classes used when playing. Since the ﬁrst author can distinguish between these scales but not
give them their correct musical names, they have been assigned arbitrary numeric designators.
This analysis was carried out from the point of view of a listener who was not party to rehearsals or discussions prior
to the performance of the piece; this means that initially, the author’s representation of what would occur in the piece
was empty, or contained general stylistic expectations of what the ﬁrst author thinks a Miles Davis fusion piece is likely to
sound like. To the musicians who were playing, a different set of musical features would be seen as novel and intentional,
and a lot of the changes which were noticed by the ﬁrst author would be expected due to whatever score had been agreed
on beforehand.
The performative labels attached to the musical act analysis presented here were constructed in an ad-hoc manner.
Hence, the terms which were used should be deﬁned and discussed more thoroughly. However, this is not a formal or
exclusive deﬁnition — more a sketch of the type of analysis which musical acts are aimed at creating.
The performatives used in this analysis, and their intended meanings were:
Propose occurs when an agent introduces a new musical idea; this should be an idea which does not conﬂict with any
of the material which is already present — for example, introducing a harmonic structure when previously only
percussive strikes were being played, or introducing a melody when previously only chords and rhythms were
being played. In the analysis, the trumpet introduces a lyrical phrase based around a particular scale (0:34–0:55).
The performative intention is that the idea being introduced becomes a part of the shared representation.
Conﬁrm occurs when an agent (A) proposes an idea, and another agent (B) indicates amenability to working with this idea;
a typical way to carry this out would be for (A) to adopt the idea in its own playing. Again at (0:34–0:55), the
clarinet takes up the musical idea introduced by the trumpet. The performative intention is that the new idea
becomes part of the shared representation for the agents.
Reject is used by B to indicate unwillingness to adopt A’s suggestion — for example, by playing something different to
A’s idea, or emphatically not taking it up. The performative intention here is that the new idea is not taken up,
and does not become part of the shared representation. (1:08–1:35) shows the clarinet suggesting an idea, and
the trumpet rejecting it by returning to previous ideas.
Extend happens when an agent presents an elaboration of an already existing idea — for example adding extensions to a
chord, playing an elaboration of melody. The intention again is the addition of the new idea to the agents’ shared
representation. At the beginning of the analysis (0:35–0:55), the xylophone uses the scale which is present, but
adds additional, dissonant elements.
Alter is used to change an existing musical idea in some way which has a relationship to the existing material, but
cannot be seen as an elaboration of it — for instance changing from a bossa-nova to a son rhythm, or substituting
a chord in a chord sequence with one which is harmonically related. (This is a suggested act, not present in this
particular analysis.)
Request has the intention of causing an action which is not musically related to the musical idea embodied in the action
— in the analysis (3:35–4:11), the snare drum plays a crescendo which both provides a point of organisation and
a steadily increasing tension which indicates a desire for a new musical direction, without specifying what that
direction is.
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Musical act analysis of Little Blue Frog, by Miles Davis.
Time (s) Instrument Performative Description
0:00–0:09 Bass, guitar PROPOSE Bass+electric guitar establish a tonal centre. Bass suggests tonic, and guitar replies with an
extension
Bass, guitar CONFIRM Repeated as a conﬁrmation, and then the guitar suggests an alternative extension
0:09–0:34 Cuica CONFIRM Cuica conﬁrms the current beat
Tablas PROPOSE Tablas suggest a “1 2+” rhythm
0:34–0:55 Trumpet PROPOSE Trumpet suggests a scale 1 and a lyrical phrase
Clarinet CONFIRM Clarinet echoes the same scale, in a similarly lyrical style
Xylophone EXTEND Xylophone follows the given scale, but adds dissonant elements
Backing None Backing abandons complex rhythm
0:55–1:08 Trumpet EXTEND Exploring scale 1
Clarinet CONFIRM Follows trumpet’s exploration of scale 1
Triangle PROPOSE Suggests a more explicit rhythm
Trumpet CONFIRM Spiky notes agree with triangle’s suggestion
1:08–1:35 Triangle REQUEST A loud clang signals the start of a new section
Clarinet PROPOSEa A new scale 2 still in a lyrical style
Trumpet REJECT By sticking with scale 1, the trumpet rejects the clarinet’s proposal
1:35–1:47 Xylophone CONFIRM Xylophone conﬁrms clarinet’s scale 2
Trumpet CONFIRMb Trumpet gives in to the new scale, and leaves with a few parting blasts
1:47–2:00 Triangle EXTEND Many muted notes extend and emphasise the rhythmic ideas
Trumpet EXTEND Using scale 2, the trumpet adds an increasing rhythmic element
Clarinet PROPOSE Clarinet introduces a new scale 3 (more eastern sounding), ignores the trumpet’s rhythmic
direction and continues lyrically
2:00–2:13 Trumpet PROPOSE A spiky, stabbing phrase, based on scale 2
Clarinet CONFIRM Brieﬂy seems to agree with the trumpet
2:13–2:29 Bass clarinet CONFIRM Conﬁrms scale 3
Trumpet REJECT Ignores bass clarinet, and continues with stabs
Clarinet REJECT Ignores bass clarinet, and continues with lyricism in scale 2
2:29–2:43 Trumpet clarinet
Bass clarinet
ARGUE All play lyrically, with clarinet on scale 2, trumpet on 1 and bass clarinet in 3
2:43–3:08 Trumpet PROPOSE Proposes a resolution, by playing stabs which ﬁt with any of the scales
3:03–3:08 E-PianoVibes CONFIRM Supports the trumpet’s resolution
3:08–3:17 Backing REJECT Increased dissonance and rhythmic confusion reject the proposed resolution
3:17–3:35 All CONFUSION
3:55–4:11 Snare REQUEST Snare enters to call for new section with crescendoing 8th notes
Winds CONFIRM Winds join in with the 8th note idea
4:08–4:11 Triangle CONFIRM A bar of loud crotchets pinpoints the section change called for by the snare drum
a Repeated suggestion, so maybe followed by PROPOSE-AGAIN?
b Also withdraws — do we need a WITHDRAW?
Argue is a composite act; it happens when several musicians are presenting conﬂicting ideas at the same time — for
example, at (2:29–2:43) where the melody instruments are all playing with different scales.
The performatives used in this analysis were: PROPOSE, CONFIRM, REJECT, EXTEND, ALTER, REQUEST, ARGUE.
Appendix C. Musical common ground example
To illustrate ideas about analysis and common ground, we use a caricature of a jazz trio:
• A is a drummer, with an advanced understanding of rhythm, but no knowledge of chords.
• B is a bass player, and has an understanding of chords and rhythmic patterns.
• C is a pianist, with an advanced understanding of chords, but little idea about rhythms.
• D is a guitarist, with the same capabilities as the pianist idea about rhythms.
They each then have their own set of analysers, as shown in the table — for instance, A has Astructure which keeps track
of where they are in the piece, Atime-signature , and Arhythm .
See Fig. 8 for a diagrammatic version of this.
At a particular point in the piece, the outputs of these analysers are:
• (Time-Signature: 4/4),
• (Harmony: C) (A simple knowledge of the root of the chord),
• (Harmony-Adv: C7) (More reﬁned harmonic analysis of the chord),
• (Rhythm: basic swing),
• (Chord: 7th).
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Here, there are several common grounds, assuming that each agent has perfect knowledge of the other’s capabilities:
• between the entire group about what the time signature is, and what the structure of the piece is,
• between the bassist, guitarist and pianist about the basics of the chord sequence,
• between the guitarist and pianist of the complex harmonic material being used,
• between the bassist and drummer about the complex rhythmic material being used.
For example, it might be expected that the drummer had knowledge of chord sequences. In this case, the other players
would suppose that the common ground included (Harmony: C), and be surprised if they learnt that this was not the case.
Agent CV
A (Time-Signature: 4/4), (Structure: Verse), (Rhythm: basic swing)
B (Structure: Verse), (Time-Signature: 4/4), (Rhythm: basic swing), (Harmony: C)
C/D (Structure: Verse), (Time-Signature: 4/4), (Rhythm: basic swing), (Harmony: C),
(Harmony-Adv: C7)
Appendix D. Experiment description
An experiment was carried out to test the use of Musical Acts within an interactive situation. We give a brief description
here, and a more thorough analysis can be found in Murray-Rust [14, Sections 10.2, 11].
This experiment was designed to measure the perceived performance of the system when interacting with human mu-
sicians. Pianists were asked to play a series of short duets with an unseen partner, who they might reasonably expect to
be another human. After each duet, they were asked to rate their partner’s performance by scoring their responses to a
series of questions. In order to differentiate aspects of the musical experience, a series of situations were created which
were hypothesised to have different amounts of expressivity and interactivity. These conditions were:
Human: another human (expressive and interactive),
Recording: a recording of a human (expressive but not interactive),
Straight: a completely mechanical rendering of the music (neither expressive nor interactive),
Mirroring: the system copying features from the human’s input (expressive, and slightly interactive),
Reasoning: the system using the learnt interaction data to inform its responses to the human player (expressive, and more
interactive).
By comparing the rating of the humans for the different conﬁgurations, it was hoped to be able to determine whether
the addition of an understanding of Musical Acts to a system improves its performance.
The participants were asked to play “Canto Ostinato”, by Simeon ten Holt. This is a piece for two or more pianos, where
repetitive phrases are played for a length of time determined by the performers. In the experiment, a small range of bars
were chosen, and then number of repeats deﬁned, in order to simplify the pianists’ task, and allow them to concentrate on
the expressive side of the musical interaction.
The steps taken to conﬁgure the system for the experiment were:
• encode the score in an appropriate, machine readable form,
• deﬁne a set of features which could be used to inform analysis and generation of playing,
• learn sequences of actions within the space of features from example human playing.
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A limited set of feature categories were used, representing those aspects of playing over which the performers were
allowed control:
• note volume (velocity),
• onset times (relative to a metronome),
• note lengths (as proportions of their scored values).
For each of these categories, a feature was calculated describing:
• the average value,
• a trend in the average value,
• a pattern value, consisting of the residuals once the average and the trend have been removed, for each note position in
a bar (based on the assumption that each bar consists of two groups of ﬁve equally spaced notes). This is designed to
model repetitive patterns of accents, e.g., placing emphasis on the ﬁrst and third notes of each ﬁve note group.
These were calculated ﬁrst as numeric values, and then segmented to give symbolic values; for instance, note volumes
were expressed with the standard musical markings such as pp, mf and f. In each case the lattice values are formed as
follows:
• for the basic value (e.g. dynamics, onset timing), the medium value is the root of the lattice, with more extreme values
making up the branches of the lattice (see Fig. 9). From this, we can say that e.g. mf subsumes f, and is disjoint from
pp;
• for pattern values, the pairwise meet of each element in the pattern is calculated. If this is equal to value A, then A
subsumes B (and vice versa). If each value is , then they are disjoint, and otherwise A is an alteration of B.
This gives a total of 9 facets:
{dynamics,onset, length} × {average, trend,pattern}
These features were tuned to the piece at hand — in particular, the use of ﬁve note patterns. The features analysed here
are essentially numeric in nature, and were symbolised in a relatively crude manner — this is a particular style of analysis
which was appropriate for working with this piece.
For all of these features, an analysis procedure was created which could extract their symbolic values from music, and
derive relations between pairs of values. This provided the basis of the analysis section.
D.2. Deliberation
In order to use these features in a musical act context, a mechanism is needed to ﬁrst generate new action signatures,
and then ﬁnd a realisation of those signatures. An initial phase of learning was performed to give the system an initial
musical grounding, which was then used for deliberation during the experiment. The learning phase was as follows:
• Recordings were made of a pair of pianists playing the excerpts which would be used in the experiment.
• These recordings were annotated using the analysis procedures described above, to produce symbolic values for all the
different facets.
• Based on the assumptions made in Section 5, and the relationships between values discussed previously, Musical Act
Signatures were extracted from these symbolic values. A separate stream of MASs was produced for each facet under
analysis.
• All of the streams were the used to build up a tree representing all of the sequences of MASs which have been encoun-
tered, and their counts. This represents the system’s memory of patterns found from human interaction.
During the interaction, the results from this were used to inform the playing of the system as follows:
• Values were extracted from the human’s playing, using the same automatic procedures described above.
• Any new values are combined with the current context to produce a MAS. For each facet under analysis, a sequence of
MASs is maintained, containing both the human and the system’s actions.
• When a new value from the human is encountered, the current sequence is passed to the sequence completion algo-
rithm. This contains all of the sequences of MASs learnt in the previous step, and will
– match the longest subsequence of the current MAS sequence which is present in the database,
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– randomly pick a subsequent MAS based on the counts for each possible continuation of this sequence found in the
corpus.10
• Once a suitable MAS was chosen, the system would search for a value which fulﬁlled it, and then enact that in its
playing. In general terms, the search can be seen as partitioning off the graph according to the current values and the
relations given by the chosen MAS, and then randomly choosing a value from the selected partition.
D.3. Example deliberation
In order to demonstrate the behaviour of the system when playing with a human pianist, we present a short constructed
example. This example will focus on the mean dynamics facet, i.e. the general overall loudness with which one is playing.
During operation of the system, an identical process is carried out for all of the 9 facets under analysis.
• During the course of playing, both the human and the system are playing mf when the human’s average level shifts to
ff. The action has the signature H: (SUBSUMED,SAME,SAME).
• This is added to the sequence which is being maintained for mean volume, and a subsequent MAS is suggested:
C: (DISJOINT,DISJOINT,SUBSUMES), i.e. to play something which is signiﬁcantly different from the playing of both
the computer and the human.
• In this case, this is then limited to values from the other branch of the lattice (see Fig. 9), and anything from mp to pp
could be chosen.
• Alternatively, if C: (SUBSUMED,SUBSUMED,SUBSUMED) had been chosen, this would limit actions to values which
were further down the right hand side of the lattice, and only ff would be possible.
• Whichever value is chosen, the system would then start playing music at that volume.
D.4. Results
The experiment was run as a pilot study, using pianists studying at Napier University. 5 subjects were used, each car-
rying out 12 interactions, with the condition of each action randomly chosen and blinded. Responses consisted of numeric
scores for 13 questions, grouped roughly into questions about interactivity, expressivity, and general competence.11 The 13-
dimensional scores were then reduced to 3 factors using PCA. By looking at the loadings of each factor onto the questions,
the factors were loosely mapped onto:
1. interactivity,
10 This is very loosely modelled on behaviour from the Continuator [27].
11 These groupings were not available to the participants.
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2. competence and expressivity,
3. interactivity and general performance.
The aggregate results are shown in Fig. 10. Looking at the mean scores of these conditions, and performing t-tests, the
following hypotheses were tested (using α = 0.05):
• A human is seen as more interactive than a recording of a human (Factor 1). t(3) = 0.56, p = 0.3, not signiﬁcant.12
• The system in “mirroring” mode is more interactive than a straight recording. t(4) = 1.98, p = 0.06, not signiﬁcant.
• The system in “reasoning” mode is more interactive than the system in “mirroring” mode. t(4) = 1.26, p = 0.14, not
signiﬁcant.
Despite the fact that all of the differences in means are in a direction which supports these hypotheses, no signiﬁcant
differences were found. However, this may be attributed to the small sample size (n = 5).
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